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– to the public, and yet so right in what he secretly did and ordered. –

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Today’s post is borne out of my current research project, where I am analyzing a report by Canadian Justice Department investigator George C. Cooper concerning Dr. Ewen Cameron and his psychiatric techniques.

I was organizing the various useful pieces when I came across this one:

The June 1, 1951 meeting that took place in the Ritz Carlton Hotel in Montreal, described in section 3 of this opinion, was the starting point for cooperative effort among the three countries in defence-related research into problems of the mind.

“Problems” of the mind…what a colossal understatement that is.

If you know what Ewen Cameron was doing to people then you know that his goal was utter annihilation of whatever these powers-that-be (British inteligence, Vatican etc.) had deemed these “problems” were – largely for having views that were not acceptable. To them, that is.

The undertaking born out of that meeting between Canadian, British, and American intelligence personnel wasn’t just research, it was actually part of a WAR – a war against those they deemed a threat to their plans.

I decided to add a little note to that “piece” I just showed you, my note said:

The purpose of war – to bring about a more amenable frame of mind.

It is a quote I’ve used before.

But after I added it and I saw it couched up right up there against the “meeting” statement by Cooper, and knowing as I do just how far Cameron (and people like him) went in this “research”, it suddenly occurred to me that there was something wrong with that “amenable frame of mind” part.

As compared to what these people’s actual demonstrable goals were (and have always been) towards those that they are afraid of? It was too weak.

I decided to re-visit just exactly where, and in what context, that idea came from.

L. Ron Hubbard was a product of the Cold War era, as was his pet intelligence organization – the Guardian’s Office. Around a year before he actually formed that office he gave a lecture as part of the Saint Hill Special briefing course called Handling the PTS on 8 June 1965. You can listen to that lecture here.

He brings up a man named Clausewitz in this lecture –

Now, war was defined by a fellow by the name of Clausewitz.

…And I can shorthand this— it’s in horrible German, and if you quoted it completely and so forth it would break your brains.

…so I’ll give you the shortened version, which is simply this: “War is a means of  bringing about a more amenable frame of mind on the part of the enemy.“ [laughing]

Hubbard then tries to have it be believed that Clausewitz writings are against the idea of an obliterated enemy.

And that’s what war is. And that’s all war is. Frankie, [President Roosevelt] however, he wanted unconditional surrender. Now, would you please figure out what “unconditional surrender“ has to do with that definition of war by Clausewitz? Unconditional surrender is not a more amenable frame of mind on the part of the enemy at all. It’s an obliterated enemy.

And continues with his own personal made-up definition/summation of Clausewitz and how that applies to scientology tactics –

War is simply “bring about a more amenable frame of mind on the part of the enemy”, and that is all war is. And when you fail to halt it at that point and then negotiate and fix up the differences, why, you’re a fool.

…And the situation we’re in is that our people get chopped up and our organizations get enturbulated by certain actions taken in the environment against Scientology. Well now, how much reaction should there be to that? And it should be just enough reaction to bring about a more amenable frame of mind. That’s all. That’s on the broad, broad public view.

So, the idea you get here is that this Clausewitz person is the source of this idea that the purpose of war is to bring about a more amenable frame of mind.

This idea again shows up in another form and direction of Hubbard’s teachings.

The Church of Scientology Intelligence Bureau was initially part of the Guardian Office. Part of the training for Intelligence Bureau staff was a confidential Hubbard Communications Office Policy Letter (HCOPL for short) called Battle Tactics written by Ron Hubbard. The HCOPL was first issued in 1969 and it was made part of the Confidential GO Intelligence Course (Section 4 Part D, #6).

Here is that HCOPL. Note the parts I highlighted in yellow on the first page.

battle tactics clausewitz february 1969 hubbard highlighted

.battle tactics clausewitz february 1969 hubbard

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You’ll notice the highlighted parts say (with Clausewitz name misspelled) –

The end product of war, according to Klausewitz, the authority on it, is (condensed) “to bring about a more amenable frame of mind on the part of the enemy”.

And yet, paradoxically both to the above and to his 1965 tape where he says an obliterated enemy is not the goal, Hubbard adds this instruction:

“We must ourselves fight on a basis of total attrition of the enemy. […] Just go all the way in and obliterate him.

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Forming another part of training people to do intelligence work in scientology for him, Hubbard had a suggested reading list, and herein is our first major correction that needs to be made.

Quite a few people have erroneously source this reading list as having Clausewitz’s On War on it.

That is false.

Here is the actual issue – called a Flag Order (FO) – #2191 that is often erroneously cited as supposedly having On War as part of the list.

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fo-2191-lrh-intelligence-espionage-booklist

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As you can see, Clausewitz’s book is not on this list.

Where that particular book does show up as required reading is in an entirely different place, and one that was not created specifically by L. Ron Hubbard. This particular source was created directly by Office of Special Affairs personnel. The Office of Special Affairs replaced the Guardian’s Office.

What source am I referring to?

Scientology’s (OSA) Office of Special Affairs course that Heber Jentszch took as a requirement prior to becoming president of the Church of Scientology.

In a 1988 US court case involving former Scientology “Mission Holder” Bent Corydon, the “Full Hat Checksheet” Jentszch was entered into the record and consequently into the public domain. (It comprises pages 000503-000522 of the record.) Completed between April – June 1988, the checksheet is a list of items for Jentszch to study before he could take up the post of “Pres CSI”. It was intended to acquaint him with the areas in which he would be working and to train him in the relevant Hubbard-produced “technology.”

S E A  O R G A N I Z A T I O N

OFFICE OF SPECIAL AFFAIRS INTERNATIONAL

OSA INT ED # _________                                     28 January 88

RTC
OSA INT
OSA CONTS

BUREAU 7 – Executive Division

PRESIDENT CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL FULL HAT CHECKSHEET

 

Item 150 of Heber’s checksheet shows that one of the books that IS on that intelligence book list by Hubbard, was required reading.

150.  BOOK      THE FATAL YEARS COLONEL B.C. NIKITINE WILLIAM HODGE AND COMPANY LTD. LONDON, EDNIBURGH, GLASGOW   1936 [ REFERENCE FO 2191 15. NOVEMBER 1969 INTELLIGENCE BOOK LIST]

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Item 81 is the first place that we ever see Clausewitz’s book On War actually show up as required reading. It’s under the SECTION E  –  STRATEGIC PLANNING, BATTLE PLANS AND PROGRAMS portion of the checksheet, signed off by Heber Jentszch on June 6, 1988.

read_carl_clausewitz_on_war_-_heber_jentszch

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Note that the creation date Heber’s checksheet was 28 January 1988 and that it was created by OSA (the replacement for the Guardian’s Office) and after Hubbard’s death.

As further proof that this book had not been made required reading previously for any scientology intelligence personnel (including the Guardian’s Office) I offer this.

The 1974 intelligence course.

GUARDIAN ORDER

GO 1314                                                   9 September 1974

Info Bureau only

CONFIDENTIAL
INTELLIGENCE COURSE

Intelligence “hat” section 4, part D (downloadable from this website)

intelligence_course_go_section_4_part_d_clausewitz

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PART D – STRATEGY
__________

2.   Note: Clausewitz 1st Reciprocal

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This is the only reference to Clausewitz and it isn’t even the primary source itself, it’s someone’s “Note” about it.

FYI – the first reciprocal concept is from Clausewitz’s book

We therefore repeat our proposition, that war is an act of violence, which in its application knows no bounds; as one dictates the law to the other, there arises a sort of reciprocal action, which in the conception, must lead to an extreme. This is the first reciprocal action, and the first extreme with which we meet (first reciprocal action).

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But, even that is only a tiny part of the book. Certainly not even close to getting into what Clausewitz’s concepts were regarding the state one seeks to put the enemy – which is not “a more amenable frame of mind” as Hubbard tried to re-characterize it as in the two references we covered earlier.

leaf divider.

What was Clausewitz’s view actually?

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Now we’ll get into what Clausewitz actually said (or as much as we can given the translations are accurate – his book was in German)

This is the version that I am using:

On War by CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ; Translated by MICHAEL HOWARD and PETER PARET Abridged with an Introduction and Notes by BEATRICE HEUSER; originally published 1976, published with new intro in 2007

For those interested, here you can also see an earlier translation and comparison of the original German (see links in point 2).

To Carl von Clausewitz, a military theorist writing in the 18th century, war was “a mere continuation of policy by other means”. An interesting way of putting it, to be sure.

In Books 1 and 8, the manifold forms of war, the ‘true chameleon’, are duly taken into account in the analysis, and a much subtler approach is taken: physical destruction is not the ultimate aim, but a psychological victory is.

In Book 1, we read:

War is nothing but a duel on a larger scale. Countless duels go to make up war, but a picture of it as a whole can be formed by imagining a pair of wrestlers. Each tries through physical force to compel the other to do his will; his immediate aim is to throw his opponent in order to make him incapable of further resistance.

War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will. (p.13)

As you can see, incapable of further resistance is not even close to Hubbard’s overly mild “more amenable frame of mind”.

Now let’s really dive into the portions where Clausewitz defines the goal, state of mind, etc. that is the desired result of war.

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TWO NOTES BY THE AUTHOR ON HIS PLANS FOR REVISING ON WAR first note 10 July 1927 – On War

But no less practical is the importance of another point that must be made absolutely clear, namely that war is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means. If this is firmly kept in mind throughout it will greatly facilitate the study of the subject and the whole will be easier to analyse.

 

page 10, second note – On War

[…] that defence is the stronger form of fighting with the negative purpose, attack the weaker form with the positive purpose; that major successes help bring about minor ones, so that strategic results can be traced back to certain turning-points; that a demonstration is a weaker use of force than a real attack, and that it must therefore be clearly justified; that victory consists not only in the occupation of the battlefield, but in the destruction of the enemy’s physical and psychic forces, which is usually not attained until the enemy is pursued after a victorious battle; that success is always greatest at the point where the victory was gained, and that consequently changing from one line of operations, one direction, to another can at best be regarded as a necessary evil; that a turning movement can only be justied by general superiority or by having better lines of communication or retreat than the enemy’s; that flank-positions are governed by the same consideration; that every attack loses impetus as it progresses.

Destruction of…not “more amenable”.

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Book 1 on the Nature of War page 13 – On War

Force––that is, physical force, for moral force has no existence save as expressed in the state and the law––is thus the means of war; to impose our will on the enemy is its object. To secure that object we must render the enemy powerless; and that, in theory, is the true aim of warfare.

Render powerless…not “more amenable”.

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page 14 – On War

Two different motives make men fight one another: hostile feelings and hostile intentions. Our definition is based on the latter, since it is the universal element. Even the most savage, almost instinctive, passion of hatred cannot be conceived as existing without hostile intent; but hostile intentions are often unaccompanied by any sort of hostile feelings––at least by none that predominate.

 

page 15 Point 4- The Aim is to Disarm the Enemy – On War

If the enemy is to be coerced you must put him in a situation that is even more unpleasant* than the sacrifice you call on him to make. The hardships of that situation must not of course be merely transient––at least not in appearance. Otherwise the enemy would not give in but would wait for things to improve. Any change that might be brought about by continuing hostilities must then, at least in theory, be of a kind to bring the enemy still greater disadvantages. The worst of all conditions in which a belligerent can find himself is to be utterly defenceless. Consequently, if you are to force the enemy, by making war on him, to do your bidding, you must either make him literally defenceless or at least put him in a position that makes this danger probable. It follows, then, that to overcome the enemy, or disarm him––call it what you will––must always be the aim of warfare.

Coerced, overcome, disarmed, utterly defenceless…not “more amenable”.

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page 16 The Maximum Exertion of Strength – On War

If you want to overcome your enemy you must match your effort against his power of resistance, which can be expressed as the product of two inseparable factors, viz. the total means at his disposal and the strength of his will. The extent of the means at his disposal is a matter––though not exclusively––of figures, and should be measurable.

But the strength of his will is much less easy to determine and can only be gauged approximately by the strength of the motive animating it. Assuming you arrive in this way at a reasonably accurate estimate of the enemy’s power of resistance, you can adjust your own efforts accordingly; that is, you can either increase them until they surpass the enemy’s or, if this is beyond your means, you can make your efforts as great as possible.

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page 19 In War the Result Is Never Final – On War

Lastly, even the ultimate outcome of a war is not always to be regarded as final. The defeated state often considers the outcome merely as a transitory evil, for which a remedy may still be found in political conditions at some later date. It is obvious how this, too, can slacken tension and reduce the vigour of the effort.

 

Chapter 2, page 32 – On War

[…] the war, that is the animosity and the reciprocal effects of hostile elements, cannot be considered to have ended so long as the enemy’s will has not been broken: in other words, so long as the enemy government and its allies have not been driven to ask for peace, or the population made to submit.

That one really shows just how far off Ron Hubbard’s fluffy kittens and puppy dogs re-characterization was. More importantly, this actually was Hubbard’s real intention and actions towards his enemies. Utter destruction of their lives, their minds, their hearts.

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page 36 – On War

The third, and far the most important method, judging from the frequency of its use, is to wear down the enemy. That expression is more than a label; it describes the process precisely, and is not so metaphorical as it may seem at first. Wearing down the enemy in a conflict means using the duration of the war to bring about a gradual exhaustion of his physical and moral resistance.

… But resistance is a form of action, aimed at destroying enough of the enemy’s power to force him to renounce his intentions. Every single act of our resistance is directed to that act alone, and that is what makes our policy negative.

Undoubtedly a single action, assuming it succeeds, would do less for a negative aim than it would for a positive one. But that is just the difference: the former is more likely to succeed and so to give you more security. What it lacks in immediate effectiveness it must make up for in its use of time, that is by prolonging the war. Thus the negative aim, which lies at the heart of pure resistance, is also the natural formula for outlasting the enemy, for wearing him down.

Here lies the origin of the distinction that dominates the whole of war: the difference between attack and defence. We shall not pursue the matter now, but let us just say this: that from the negative purpose derive all the advantages, all the more effective forms, of fighting, and that in it is expressed the dynamic relationship between the magnitude and the likelihood of success. All this will be gone into later.

If a negative aim––that is, the use of every means available for pure resistance––gives an advantage in war, the advantage need only be enough to balance any superiority the opponent may possess: in the end his political object will not seem worth the effort it costs. He must then renounce his policy. It is evident that this method, wearing down the enemy, applies to the great number of cases where the weak endeavour to resist the strong.

All of the above is something that Hubbard and his ilk sought to “break” in others, their ability to resist them. I cannot understate the importance of this passage by Clausewitz, for it lines up perfectly with the very thing that Black Op people of the Abyssopelagic level try so very hard to break.

Your will. Your soul.

Let me pause here for a moment, and give you a practical example. These are some of the things that are desired/expected by those that are currently the enemies of my will, my soul, that which makes me, me.

These are things which they are working towards trying to get me to renounce.

*Caveat, none of these are “as a result of scientology”.

  • That spirit, you, is immortal, has lived before, and carries the marks of that experience into each new life and is responsible for that which they bring to that new life, whether good or bad.
  • That telepathy exists, is very real, and is never crazy or “of the devil”.
  • That a reckoning towards those who are at war with the aforementioned two things (as well as many other things) and who are engaged in trying to permanently break the will of anyone who resists them, is not only needed, it is imperative.
  • That a person’s love, the intimate sharing of their soul, their loyalty and their support can never (and should never) be enforced through coercion, deception, or any other destructive means, nor does anyone deserve these things automatically and without regard. They must be given freely and to whom one wishes, or not at all.

These are just a few of the things that my enemies would readily agree that myself and my husband need to renounce.

The two biggest supposed mental help scientific subjects, psychiatry and psychology, do not ever take into account the first point mentioned above. The one religion on earth that is in complete lockstep with them on the matter, the parent of all the major religions – Catholicism.

Does any one else find that rather odd? They should be against each other on that point, but they’re not.

Why do I think that is?

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Because they all traffic in breaking the will of those that resist them.

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I say –

Those who live by that sword, will die by that same sword.

On that note, let’s review this key passage again.

page 36 – On War

The third, and far the most important method, judging from the frequency of its use, is to wear down the enemy. That expression is more than a label; it describes the process precisely, and is not so metaphorical as it may seem at first. Wearing down the enemy in a conflict means using the duration of the war to bring about a gradual exhaustion of his physical and moral resistance.

… But resistance is a form of action, aimed at destroying enough of the enemy’s power to force him to renounce his intentions. Every single act of our resistance is directed to that act alone, and that is what makes our policy negative.

Undoubtedly a single action, assuming it succeeds, would do less for a negative aim than it would for a positive one. But that is just the difference: the former is more likely to succeed and so to give you more security. What it lacks in immediate effectiveness it must make up for in its use of time, that is by prolonging the war. Thus the negative aim, which lies at the heart of pure resistance, is also the natural formula for outlasting the enemy, for wearing him down.

Here lies the origin of the distinction that dominates the whole of war: the difference between attack and defence. We shall not pursue the matter now, but let us just say this: that from the negative purpose derive all the advantages, all the more effective forms, of fighting, and that in it is expressed the dynamic relationship between the magnitude and the likelihood of success. All this will be gone into later.

If a negative aim––that is, the use of every means available for pure resistance––gives an advantage in war, the advantage need only be enough to balance any superiority the opponent may possess: in the end his political object will not seem worth the effort it costs. He must then renounce his policy. It is evident that this method, wearing down the enemy, applies to the great number of cases where the weak endeavour to resist the strong.

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A policy renouncing it will be then. (inside joke)

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page 37 – On War

So much then for the ends to be pursued in war; let us now turn to the means.

There is only one: combat. However many forms combat takes, however far it may be removed from the brute discharge of hatred and enmity of a physical encounter, however many forces may intrude which themselves are not part of fighting, it is inherent in the very concept of war that everything that occurs must originally derive from combat.

If a decision by fighting is the basis of all plans and operations, it follows that the enemy can frustrate everything through a successful battle. This occurs not only when the encounter affects an essential factor in our plans, but when any victory that is won is of sufficient scope. For every important victory––that is, destruction of opposing forces––reacts on all other possibilities. Like liquid, they will settle at a new level.

Thus it is evident that destruction of the enemy forces is always the superior, more effective means, with which others cannot compete.

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Destruction of the enemy forces… not “more amenable”.

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page 42 – On War

What has been said about plans and forces being directed to other uses refers only to the positive purposes, other than the destruction of enemy forces, that can be pursued in war. It pertains in no way to pure resistance, which seeks to wear down the opponent’s strength. Pure resistance has no positive intention; we can use our forces only to frustrate the enemy’s intentions, and not divert them to other objectives.

Here we must consider the negative side of destroying the enemy’s forces––that is, the preservation of our own. These two efforts always go together; they interact. They are integral parts of a single purpose, and we only need to consider the result if one or the other dominates. The effort to destroy the enemy’s forces has a positive purpose and leads to positive results, whose final aim is the enemy’s collapse. Preserving our own forces has a negative purpose; it frustrates the enemy’s intentions––that is, it amounts to pure resistance, whose ultimate aim can only be to prolong the war until the enemy is exhausted.

The policy with a positive purpose calls the act of destruction into being; the policy with a negative purpose waits for it.

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The enemy’s collapse…not “more amenable”.

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page 43 – On War

The one certain effect a preponderantly negative policy will have is to retard the decision: in other words, action is transposed into waiting for the decisive moment. This usually means that action is postponed in time and space to the extent that space is relevant and circumstances permit. If the time arrives when further waiting would bring excessive disadvantages, then the benefit of the negative policy has been exhausted. The destruction of the enemy––an aim that has until then been postponed but not displaced by another consideration––now re-emerges.

Destruction of the enemy…not “more amenable”.

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page 45 – On War

 

… Courage is of two kinds: courage in the face of personal danger, and courage to accept responsibility, either before the tribunal of some outside power or before the court of one’s own conscience. Only the first kind will be discussed here.

.. Courage in face of personal danger is also of two kinds. It may be indifference to danger, which could be due to the individual’s constitution, or to his holding life cheap, or to habit. In any case, it must be regarded as a permanent condition. Alternatively, courage may result from such positive motives as ambition, patriotism, or enthusiasm of any kind. In that case courage is a feeling, an emotion, not a permanent state.

These two kinds of courage act in different ways. The first is the more dependable; having become second nature, it will never fail.

So people who run from their conscience, blame others for their failings and don’t accept responsibility for their own bad decisions in life?

Cowards.

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page 46 – On War

The other will often achieve more. There is more reliability in the first kind, more boldness in the second. The first leaves the mind calmer; the second tends to stimulate, but it can also blind. The highest kind of courage is a compound of both.

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Even Clausewitz obviously knew some unseen force clearly in those persons who have true courage and determination – who are not cowards in the court of their own conscience.

The spirit.

page 47 – On War

… If the mind is to emerge unscathed from this relentless struggle with the unforeseen, two qualities are indispensable: first, an intellect that, even in the darkest hour, retains some glimmerings of the inner light which leads to truth; and second, the courage to follow this faint light wherever it may lead. The first of these qualities is described by the French term, coup d’oeil; the second is determination.

Coup d’oeil therefore refers not alone to the physical but, more commonly, to the inward eye. The expression, like the quality itself, has certainly always been more applicable to tactics, but it must also have its place in strategy, since here as well quick decisions are often needed. Stripped of metaphor and of the restrictions imposed on it

by the phrase, the concept merely refers to the quick recognition of a truth that the mind would ordinarily miss or would perceive only after long study and reflection.

… Determination in a single instance is an expression of courage; if it becomes characteristic, a mental habit. But here we are referring not to physical courage but to the courage to accept responsibility, courage in the face of a moral danger.

This has often been called courage d’esprit, because it is created by the intellect. That, however, does not make it an act of the intellect: it is an act of temperament. Intelligence alone is not courage; we often see that the most intelligent people are irresolute. Since in the rush of events a man is governed by feelings rather than by thought, the intellect needs to arouse the quality of courage, which then supports and sustains it in action.

Looked at in this way, the role of determination is to limit the agonies of doubt and the perils of hesitation when the motives for action are inadequate. Colloquially, to be sure, the term ‘determination’ also applies to a propensity for daring, pugnacity, boldness, or temerity. But when a man has adequate grounds for action––whether subjective or objective, valid or false––he cannot properly be called ‘determined’.

Take heed out there, it is these qualities that will defeat any enemy in the end. But you can’t just say or tell yourself you have them, you have to live them.

Telepathy, perceiving things at a distance come under the category of “glimmerings of the inner light“.

In today’s break-your-will dominated world, few are brave enough, confident enough, or responsible enough to actually follow “this faint light wherever it may lead.”

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page 48 – On War

.. More is required to create determination than a mere conjunction of superior insight with the appropriate emotions. Some may bring the keenest brains to the most formidable problems, and may possess the courage to accept serious responsibilities; but when faced with a difficult situation they still find themselves unable to reach a decision. Their courage and their intellect work in separate compartments, not together; determination, therefore, does not result. It is engendered only by a mental act; the mind tells man that boldness is required, and thus gives direction to his will. This particular cast of mind, which employs the fear of wavering and hesitating to suppress all other fears, is the force that makes strong men determined.

Men of low intelligence, therefore, cannot possess determination in the sense in which we use the word. They may act without hesitation in a crisis, but if they do, they act without reflection; and a man who acts without reflection cannot, of course, be torn by doubt.

From time to time action of this type may even be appropriate; but, as I have said before, it is the average result that indicates the existence of military genius. The statement may surprise the reader who knows some determined cavalry officers who are little given to deep thought: but he must remember that we are talking about a special kind of intelligence, not about great powers of meditation.

In short, we believe that determination proceeds from a special type of mind, from a strong rather than a brilliant one.

 

page 49 – On War

Four elements make up the climate of war: danger, exertion, uncertainty, and chance. If we consider them together, it becomes evident how much fortitude of mind and character are needed to make progress in these impeding elements with safety and success.

According to circumstance, reporters and historians of war use such terms as energy, firmness, staunchness, emotional balance, and strength of character. These products of a heroic nature could almost be treated as one and the same force––strength of will––which adjusts itself to circumstances: but though closely linked, they are not identical.

A closer study of the interplay of psychological forces at work here may be worth while.

To begin with, clear thought demands that we keep one point in mind: of the weight, the burden, the resistance––call it what you like––that challenges the psychological strength of the soldier, only a small part is the direct result of the enemy’s activity, his resistance, or his operations

Note that last colored bolded part closely – it is from YOU that the weakening actually is created. Simple solution? Don’t allow it.

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page 50 – On War

So long as a unit fights cheerfully, with spirit and elan, great strength of will is rarely needed; but once conditions become difficult, as they must when much is at stake, things no longer run like a well-oiled machine. The machine itself begins to resist, and the commander needs tremendous will-power to overcome this resistance.

The machine’s resistance need not consist of disobedience and argument, though this occurs often enough in individual soldiers.

It is the impact of the ebbing of moral and physical strength, of the heart-rending spectacle of the dead and wounded, that the commander has to withstand––first in himself, and then in all those who, directly or indirectly, have entrusted him with their thoughts and feelings, hopes and fears. As each man’s strength gives out, as it no longer responds to his will, the inertia of the whole gradually comes to rest on the commander’s will alone. The ardour of his spirit must rekindle the flame of purpose in all others; his inward fire must revive their hope. Only to the extent that he can do this will he retain his hold on his men and keep control. Once that hold is lost, once his own courage can no longer revive the courage of his men, the mass will drag him down to the brutish world where danger is shirked and shame is unknown.

Energy in action varies in proportion to the strength of its motive, whether the motive be the result of intellectual conviction or of emotion. Great strength, however, is not easily produced where there is no emotion.

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Again, the recognition of the spiritual aspect as the true source of power and will. So if the goal of war is utter destruction, that means:

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The purpose of their kind of war is total destruction of the person’s spirit.

That inner light.

Ingrid_Bergman_with_Charles_Boyer_in_Gaslight_1944

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Now, with that corrected purpose/definition, a whole lot of strange behaviors begin to make complete sense.

Which is on topic to what we’ll get into next.

Character.

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page 51 – On War

Staunchness indicates the will’s resistance to a single blow; endurance refers to prolonged resistance.

Though the two terms are similar and are often used interchangeably, the difference between them is significant and unmistakable.

Staunchness in face of a single blow may result from strong emotion, whereas intelligence helps sustain endurance. The longer an action lasts, the more deliberate endurance becomes, and this is one of its sources of strength.

We now turn to strength of mind, or of character, and must first ask what we mean by these terms.

Not, obviously, vehement display of feeling, or passionate temperament: that would strain the meaning of the phrase. We mean the ability to keep one’s head at times of exceptional stress and violent emotion. Could strength of intellect alone account for such a faculty?

We doubt it.

 

page 52 – On War

… Therefore we would argue that a strong character is one that will not be unbalanced by the most powerful emotions.

If we consider how men differ in their emotional reactions, we first find a group with small capacity for being roused, usually known as ‘stolid or “phlegmatic”. Second, there are men who are extremely active, but whose feelings never rise above a certain level, men whom we know to be sensitive but calm.

Third, there are men whose passions are easily inflamed, in whom excitement flares up suddenly but soon burns out, like gunpowder.

And finally we come to those who do not react to minor matters, who will be moved only very gradually, not suddenly, but whose emotions attain great strength and durability. These are the men whose passions are strong, deep, and concealed.

These variants are probably related to the physical forces operating in the human being––they are part of that dual organism we call the nervous system, one side of which is physical, the other psychological.

With our slight scientific knowledge we have no business to go farther into that obscure field; it is important nonetheless to note the ways in which these various psychological combinations can affect military activity, and to find out how far one can look for great strength of character among them.

… Stolid men are hard to throw off balance, but total lack of vigour cannot really be interpreted as strength of character. It cannot be denied, however, that the imperturbability of such men gives them a certain narrow usefulness in war. They are seldom strongly motivated, lack initiative and consequently are not particularly active; on the other hand they seldom make a serious mistake.

…The salient point about the second group [sensitive and calm usually] is that trifles can suddenly stir them to act, whereas great issues are likely to overwhelm them. This kind of man will gladly help an individual in need, but the misfortune of an entire people will only sadden him; they will not stimulate him to action.

 

page 53 – On War

… Lastly, we come to men who are difficult to move but have strong feelings––men who are to the previous type like heat to a shower of sparks. These are the men who are best able to summon the titanic strength it takes to clear away the enormous burdens that obstruct activity in war. Their emotions move as great masses do––slowly but irresistibly.

… We repeat again: strength of character does not consist solely in having powerful feelings, but in maintaining one’s balance in spite of them. Even with the violence of emotion, judgement and principle must still function like a ship’s compass, which records the slightest variations however rough the sea.

 

page 54 – On War

We say a man has strength of character, or simply has character, if he sticks to his convictions, whether these derive from his own opinions or someone else’s, whether they represent principles, attitudes, sudden insights, or any other mental force. Such firmness cannot show itself, of course, if a man keeps changing his mind. This need not be the consequence of external influence; the cause may be the workings of his own intelligence, but this would suggest a peculiarly insecure mind. Obviously a man whose opinions are constantly changing, even though this is in response to his own reflections, would not be called a man of character. The term is applied only to men whose views are stable and constant. This may be because they are well thought-out, clear, and scarcely open to revision; or, in the case of indolent men, because such people are not in the habit of mental effort and therefore have no reason for altering their views; and finally, because a firm decision, based on fundamental principle derived from reflection, is relatively immune to changes of opinion.

With its mass of vivid impressions and the doubts which characterize all information and opinion, there is no activity like war to rob men of confidence in themselves and in others, and to divert them from their original course of action.

In the dreadful presence of suffering and danger, emotion can easily overwhelm intellectual conviction, and in this psychological fog it is so hard to form clear and complete insights that changes of view become more understandable and excusable. Action can never be based on anything firmer than instinct, a sensing of the truth.

Nowhere, in consequence, are differences of opinion so acute as in war, and fresh opinions never cease to batter at one’s convictions. No degree of calm can provide enough protection: new impressions are too powerful, too vivid, and always assault the emotions as well as the intellect.

Only those general principles and attitudes that result from clear and deep understanding can provide a comprehensive guide to action. It is to these that opinions on specific problems should be anchored.

The difficulty is to hold fast to these results of contemplation in the torrent of events and new opinions. Often there is a gap between principles and actual events that cannot always be bridged by a succession of logical deductions. Then a measure of self-Confidence is needed, and a degree of scepticism is also salutary.

 

page 55 – On War

Frequently nothing short of an imperative principle will suffice, which is not part of the immediate thought-process, but dominates it: that principle is in all doubtful cases to stick to one’s first opinion and to refuse to change unless forced to do so by a clear conviction. A strong faith in the overriding truth of tested principles is needed; the vividness of transient impressions must not make us forget that such truth as they contain is of a lesser stamp. By giving precedence, in case of doubt, to our earlier convictions, by holding to them stubbornly, our actions acquire that quality of steadiness and consistency which is termed strength of character.

By a clear conviction, not because someone has stolen all your resources, drugged or knocked you to your knees trying to force you to change your “inner light”.

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page 55 – On War

It is evident how greatly strength of character depends on balanced temperament; most men of emotional strength and stability are therefore men of powerful character as well.

Strength of character can degenerate into obstinacy. The line between them is often hard to draw in a specific case; but surely it is easy to distinguish them in theory.

Obstinacy is not an intellectual defect; it comes from reluctance to admit that one is wrong. To impute this to the mind would be illogical, for the mind is the seat of judgement. Obstinacy is a fault of temperament.

Stubbornness and intolerance of contradiction result from a special kind of egotism, which elevates above everything else the pleasure of its autonomous intellect, to which others must bow. It might also be called vanity, if it were not something superior: vanity is content with the appearance alone; obstinacy demands the material reality.

We would therefore argue that strength of character turns to obstinacy as soon as a man resists another point of view not from superior insight or attachment to some higher principle, but because he objects instinctively. Admittedly, this definition may not be of much practical use; but it will nevertheless help us avoid the interpretation that obstinacy is simply a more intense form of strong character. There is a basic difference between the two. They are closely related, but one is so far from being a higher degree of the other that we can even find extremely obstinate men who are too dense to have much strength of character.

.

Otherwise known as reacting, not thinking. I know someone that is particularly well-known for this, and when called on the carpet for it they further react by accusing others (that are capable of fast response time) as doing the same thing. Of course they are not the same at all and never will be, but you can see how conversations with that person would go. See Mirroring article.

.

Finishing up with war tactics – further explanation of the defensive theory.

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Book 6 chapter 1 page 159 – On War

What is the concept of defence? The parrying of a blow. What is its characteristic feature? Awaiting the blow. It is this feature that turns any action into a defensive one; it is the only test by which defence can be distinguished from attack in war.

page 160 – On War

… If defence is the stronger form of war, yet has a negative object, it follows that it should be used only so long as weakness compels, and be abandoned as soon as we are strong enough to pursue a positive object. When one has used defensive measures successfully, a more favourable balance of strength is usually created; thus, the natural course in war is to begin defensively and end by attacking.

.

Of course, weakness could be feigned during the defensive, and not really be a weakness at all. Especially where the “real” forces lie unseen and unknown about until the “attack” actually begins.

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Book 8 page 243 – On War

To begin with, our forces must be adequate:

  • To score a decisive victory over the enemy’s
  • To make the effort necessary to pursue our victory to the point where the balance is beyond all possible redress.
  • Next, we must be certain our political position is so secure that this success will not bring further enemies against us who could force us immediately to abandon our efforts against our first opponent.

.

And there’s the key, what I just was talking about. You must be certain your position is so secure that annihilating (or thinking you have) a target person or person(s) will not now bring out further enemies, forcing YOU to have to abandon your efforts against that person or person(s) you were so hot to destroy.

A probably not understandable to my readers but necessary added personal parenthetical note: Please mark this well, oh enemy mine.

leaf divider

 

Bringing it all together – Hubbard and Clausewitz

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Blackness of purpose…

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is the one thing that will always identify a Slavemaster. It is their Kryptonite, their Achilles heel, the divining rod that will truly identify what “game” they are currently playing.

.

Evil.

.

What makes these people different are the LIES. But not just any lies. The foundation that spawns the particular lies, the foundation that brands the forehead of an Enslaver as such – is unique. Their lies that mark the course of Evil, have to do with the fact that they hate themselves.

They hate themselves for their inferiority, their weakness, their inability to WIN against superior foes.

All people with superior ability are always to some degree considered FOES. And foes must be watched, they must be studied, and above all?

They must be controlled into being different than what they truly are, someone who is now LESS than the Enslaver.

.

And that is the key.

.

The difference between.

Most of what Clausewitz put together as the “truths” about war would be better understood by clarifying that it is slavemaster war that he is actually describing.

Slavemasters go after destruction of the spirit, the heart, the “inner fire” of a person as their goal in war, their true opposition never has that as their goal. Destruction of constructs, yes, but the heart, the fire of the person?

Never.

You can now perhaps see the insurmountable problem the slavemasters have with their true opposition, and also the pit that opens up for people who take up the slavemaster mantle and make it their own.

L. Ron Hubbard is a case in point.

Let’s line up some things against each other first.

Hubbard –

Now, war was defined by a fellow by the name of Clausewitz.

…so I’ll give you the shortened version, which is simply this: “War is a means of  bringing about a more amenable frame of mind on the part of the enemy.“ [laughing] 1

…War is simply “bring about a more amenable frame of mind on the part of the enemy”, and that is all war is. And when you fail to halt it at that point and then negotiate and fix up the differences, why, you’re a fool. 1

…And the situation we’re in is that our people get chopped up and our organizations get enturbulated by certain actions taken in the environment against Scientology. Well now, how much reaction should there be to that? And it should be just enough reaction to bring about a more amenable frame of mind. That’s all. 1

The end product of war, according to Klausewitz, the authority on it, is (condensed) “to bring about a more amenable frame of mind on the part of the enemy”. 2

.

Clausewitz –

In Book 1, we read:

War is nothing but a duel on a larger scale. Countless duels go to make up war, but a picture of it as a whole can be formed by imagining a pair of wrestlers. Each tries through physical force to compel the other to do his will; his immediate aim is to throw his opponent in order to make him incapable of further resistance.

War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will. (p.13)

 

page 10, second note – On War

  • victory consists not only in the occupation of the battlefield, but in the destruction of the enemy’s physical and psychic forces

Book 1 on the Nature of War page 13 – On War

  • we must render the enemy powerless; and that, in theory, is the true aim of warfare.

page 15 Point 4- The Aim is to Disarm the Enemy – On War

  • coerced be utterly defenceless.
  • force the enemy…to do your bidding
  • overcome the enemy, or disarm him––call it what you will––must always be the aim of warfare.

Chapter 2, page 32 – On War

cannot be considered to have ended so long as the enemy’s will has not been broken

page 36 – On War

  • wear down the enemy.
  • bring about a gradual exhaustion of his physical and moral resistance.
  • destroying enough of the enemy’s power to force him to renounce his intentions.
  • He must then renounce his policy.

page 37 – On War

  • victory––that is, destruction of opposing forces
  • destruction of the enemy forces is always the superior, more effective means

page 42 – On War

  • final aim is the enemy’s collapse.

page 43 – On War

  • The destruction of the enemy––an aim that has until then been postponed but not displaced by another consideration––now re-emerges.

.

Let’s put all that in an even more shorthand form now, we have Hubbard’s interpretation of Clausewitz for public consumption –

  • “War is a means of  bringing about a more amenable frame of mind on the part of the enemy.” 
  • when you fail to halt it at that point and then negotiate and fix up the differences, why, you’re a fool.
  • it should be just enough reaction to bring about a more amenable frame of mind. That’s all.
  • Now, would you please figure out what “unconditional surrender“ has to do with that definition of war by Clausewitz? Unconditional surrender is not a more amenable frame of mind on the part of the enemy at all. It’s an obliterated enemy. 1

Clausewitz –

  •  incapable of further resistance.
  • an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will
  • destruction of …physical and psychic forces
  • powerless
  • utterly defenceless.
  • forced…to do your bidding
  • overcome…disarm
  • the enemy’s will…broken
  • exhaustion of his physical and moral resistance.
  • force him to renounce his intentions.
  • renounce his policy.
  • victory…destruction
  • destruction of the enemy
  • final aim is the enemy’s collapse.

.

As to proving Hubbard lied to scientology public and regular staff about what his understanding of the purpose of war was – I rest my case.

Clausewitz is definitely not instructing people that simply making people “more amenable”, or just making war until they are and then “fix up the differences” as Hubbard tries to portray it.

No, it’s about total destruction and obliteration, total submission and surrender.

Strangely?

Exactly what Hubbard privately and secretly instructed his Guardian’s Office intelligence force to do.

Let’s pull this one out again, by itself –

  • Now, would you please figure out what “unconditional surrender“ has to do with that definition of war by Clausewitz? Unconditional surrender is not a more amenable frame of mind on the part of the enemy at all. It’s an obliterated enemy. 1

and let’s line that up with what Hubbard said in the confidential issue Battle Tactics, four years after the above.

  • “We must ourselves fight on a basis of total attrition of the enemy. […] Just go all the way in and obliterate him.2

.

Well, would you look at that? Hubbard is actually one hundred percent aligned with Clausewitz’s actual definitions and goals/tactics of war.

Clausewitz –

  •  incapable of further resistance.
  • an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will
  • destruction of …physical and psychic forces
  • powerless
  • utterly defenceless.
  • forced…to do your bidding
  • overcome…disarm
  • the enemy’s will…broken
  • exhaustion of his physical and moral resistance.
  • force him to renounce his intentions.
  • renounce his policy.
  • victory…destruction
  • destruction of the enemy
  • final aim is the enemy’s collapse.

 

.

Hubbard was therefore lying (for bait-and-switch purposes) – in that lecture of 1965.

That being the case, let’s follow out this comparison a bit further.

Clausewitz lists the qualities of superior “battle” men – not limiting it to one side or the other. He also spent some time describing the actual source of these qualities – the psychological, the psyche, the spirit, the “inner light” – the person’s character.

Let’s make a list of those (short hand) –

  • courage in the face of personal danger, and courage to accept responsibility, either before the tribunal of some outside power or before the court of one’s own conscience.
  • an intellect that, even in the darkest hour, retains some glimmerings of the inner light which leads to truth =coup d’oeil…the inward eye.
  • the courage to follow this faint light wherever it may lead = determination.
  • the quick recognition of a truth that the mind would ordinarily miss or would perceive only after long study and reflection.
  • a special kind of intelligence
  • a special type of mind, …a strong one.
  • strength of will––which adjusts itself to circumstances
  • great strength of will is …needed…once conditions become difficult
  • The ardour of his spirit
  • his inward fire

.

That’s a hell of a list when you see it like that, eh?

OK, so now let’s look at a couple of other things from Hubbard’s Battle Tactics, particularly paying attention to at what is this obliteration supposed to be targeted.

All on a thought plane…Seeing it as a battle one can apply battle tactics to thought notions. 2

.

Again he aligns perfectly with Clausewitz, but he aligns even more perfectly with psychiatry, psychology and Catholicism, from which “psychological” warfare was truly born.

Therefore, what is Hubbard after completely obliterating and instructing his people to do so as well?

Every one of these –

  • an intellect that…retains some glimmerings of the inner light which leads to truth =coup d’oeil…the inward eye.
  • determinationthe courage to follow this faint light wherever it may lead
  • the quick recognition of a truth that the mind would ordinarily miss
  • a special kind of intelligence
  • a special and strong mind
  • great strength of will
  • ardour of his spirit
  • inward fire

Now that’s ugly.

Ron Hubbard is doing as I described are the slavemaster tactics of war Clausewitz is delineating.

Slavemasters invariably go after destruction of the spirit, the heart, the “inner fire” of a person as their goal in war.

The above also explains a lot of the “contradictions” many of us find (or found) within scientology scriptures. The “good” ideas are now provably merely bait for the hook, the “bad” ones are the truth of what scientology really is; it’s blackness of purpose.

Taking this operating basis of Hubbard (and other slavemaster types) even further, look at this that Hubbard said in The Brainwashing Manual

The end of war is the control of a conquered people

.

And this that Clausewitz said –

TWO NOTES BY THE AUTHOR ON HIS PLANS FOR REVISING ON WAR first note 10 July 1927 – On War

…the importance of another point that must be made absolutely clear, namely that war is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means.

.

Now we know what the “world” policy is that Hubbard is so in alignment on –

the destruction of the enemy’s physical and psychic forces…1

the control of a conquered people

.

Remember that meeting I mentioned in the beginning of this post?

The June 1, 1951 meeting that took place in the Ritz Carlton Hotel in Montreal, described in section 3 of this opinion, was the starting point for cooperative effort among the three countries in defence-related research into problems of the mind.

.

Now you know what Hubbard (who used this phrase too) and these other psychotic men actually meant by “problems of the mind”.

 

– – –

.

Finally, before leaving our Clausewitz main analysis here, let’s make a listing of those things which are all that is necessary to defeat their purpose.

  • endurance refers to prolonged resistance. The longer an action lasts, the more deliberate endurance becomes, and this is one of its sources of strength.
  • ability to keep one’s head at times of exceptional stress and violent emotion.
  • will not be unbalanced by the most powerful emotions.
  • sticks to his convictions
  • views are stable and constant.
  • general principles and attitudes that result from clear and deep understanding
  • hold fast to these results of contemplation
  • stick to one’s first opinion and to refuse to change unless forced to do so by a clear convictionalways able to admit that one is wrong

Use them.

leaf divider.

The War against the Spirit

The First International Congress of Mental Health was organized in London by the British National Association for Mental Hygiene. The Congress was held from 16 to 21 August, 1948.

Before the congress got started, a group of 25 people met from July 24th to August 8th. They discussed how to influence the 2,000 attendees in the direction of supporting the political objective of forming a World government. They produced a pamphlet to hand out to the 2,000 attendees that contained this statement – the ultimate goal of mental healthto help men to live with their fellows in one world.

An invisible war was now under way.

A thought war, just as Clausewitz described –

the destruction of the enemy’s…psychic forces1

 

Just after the United Nations and World Health Organization conferences (1945 and 1946 respectively) psychiatrist George Brock Chisholm (head of the WHO) and others called for a conference to form UNESCO – The United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization – and for it to be an agency within the United Nations.

When that conference began in 1945 (shortly after the United Nations officially came into existence), there were 44 participating countries whose delegates decided to create an organization that would promote a culture of peace, establish an “intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind,” and prevent another world war. When the conference ended on November 16, 1945, 37 of the participating countries founded UNESCO with the Constitution of UNESCO.

In early 1946, as head of the World Health Organization, George Brock Chisholm submitted his paper related to the founding of UNESCO, entitled: The Psychiatry of Enduring Peace and Social Progress, which became the backbone document of the Constitution of UNESCO, with Julian Huxley assigned as it’s first Director General. Julian personally describes UNESCO in this document.

In International Social Science Journal Volume XI, No. 1 1959, we find “By Way of Introduction” presented by psychiatrist John Rees. The first part of John Rees’s speech covered their new slogan “quality of life”, and the strategy of breaking all loyalty bonds and increasing public exposure of “sick and deviating personalities.”

On page 9 of the PDF, we see:

Unesco has naturally always borne in mind the phrase in its Constitution which runs: ‘wars begin in the minds of men’.

.

They have defined their battleground.

.

[…] toleration extended to the conduct abnormalities in individuals who previously had been sheltered by the family or the tribe. Consequently this also must increase the frequency with which such sick and deviating personalities are brought to public notice.

.

 

They have defined their enemies.

 

I can think of only one “class” of people that these warmongers would be so set on “bringing into public view”.

.

Those that will not, under any circumstances, accept them as “masters” of anything but their own delusions.

.

Despite all the attempts to mask that this is indeed a war they are declaring, ye ole Clausewitz points of how slavemasters wage war come through loud and clear anyway.

Hard copy - Psychiatry of Enduring Peace and Social Progress

In The Psychiatry of Enduring Peace and Social Progress – George Brock Chisholm says:

The people who definitely do not want to fight any more wars must promise annihilation to any nation which starts to fight and must be prepared immediately and ruthlessly to carry out that promise without parley or negotiation.

This involves the continual upkeep of widely dispersed atomic rocket stations covering the whole world and a continual high pressure research program to discover ever more efficient methods of killing to keep ahead of any possible competition. This must go on until we, all the people, are re-educated to be able to live in peace together…

Ergo, as Hubbard spilled the beans about – take all that and apply it to this invisible THOUGHT war – the real war they are after winning and have been for hundreds of years.

Anyone who starts to fight against their true areas (targets) of thought and spirit?

Ruthless Annihilation of the spirit, it’s will, it’s personality.

To achieve that? There must be continued research programs to discover ever more efficient methods of killing the spirit.

This is what they call “peace”.

– – –

Besides what we have already covered as the basics of typical slavemaster war, here are a few other ones to consider.

The following points of Thought Warfare were taken from International Social Science Journal, Volume XI, No. 1 1959 – Rees is listed as a contributor to this publication, as: J. R . REES, Director, World Federation for Mental Health, London

Breaking loyalty by calling people “dependent”. Brock Chisholm

A mature person is not dependent unless ill.

Not dependent – what is really meant by that is BREAKING APART people. This is “divide and conquer”. They want individuals to be isolated, weak, and with no allies, so that they can dominate you into what they want you to do.

to keep children under control, with which to prevent free thinking, with which to impose local and familial and national loyalties …and with which to blind children… stunted by inculcated loyalty.

See the HATRED of loyalty that is not to them? “Divide and Conquer” is difficult to accomplish when loyalty and strength of will are present.

Psychiatrist Harry Stack Sullivan backs up fellow psychiatrist G. Brock Chisholm and says:

“He [Chisholm]says, as does many another, that we are choosing now, perhaps passively, but inevitably, whether we shall be slaves of the next “master race,” or members of a world-unity so alert and so powerful that potential aggressors will be destroyed before they can strike the first horribly destructive blow in a future war. These are the only alternatives.

Remember – their war is against the Spirit.

Their solution? World Government.

“I think that the peoples of the world would be less hesitant to become subjects of a world government eternally vigilant to maintain overwhelming destructive force, ready instantly to use every sanction and to destroy any who would again provoke war, if it were evident to the thoughtful among them that things otherwise were not going to go on much the same way that they have gone on up to now; if, in other words, it were certain that this mighty garrison state which would exercise sovereignty over every person in the world was to be but a temporary precaution to protect the helpless while men of good will would be working out a fully civilized way of life for the peoples of the earth.”

.

Then the entire world could be under the sway of whose spirit is acceptable, and whose is not.

– – –

The phrase: “It was the effect on the Target’s mind that mattered” came from Paul Wolf’s description about The Morale Operations branch of the OSS (based on the declassified CIA documents he was presenting). The OSS was the WWII formed intelligence agency, modeled on and essentially run by the British. It rolled over into being what most people know as the CIA.

These OSS documents also heavily depended on Clausewitz’s description of the slavemaster goal of war. Here’s one example, and the wording should be quite familiar to you now, that the purpose of psychological or “invisible” war was to:

Weaken the enemy’s will to resist

And as Paul Wolff described, it was the effect on the target’s mind that mattered.

His will, his inner fire.

.

Hubbard, writing in The Brainwashing Manual (under a pseudonym and with help from the CIA) –

“The spread of Communism has never been by force of battle, but by conquest of the mind…”

.

Do you know what the enemy was, that only had recently gone active again, the one that he’s really talking about there hidden under the false colors of Communism?

I’ll give you a hint, and they were/are definitely not Communists.

Slavemasters go after destruction of the spirit, the heart, the “inner fire” of a person as their goal in war, their true opposition never has that as their goal. Destruction of constructs, yes, but the heart, the fire of the person? Never.

I’ll say it again, you can now perhaps see the insurmountable problem the slavemasters have with their true opposition and look at Hubbard’s complaint about it –

conquest of the mind…

in an entirely different light.

– – –

If someone has targeted you for black operations, they will be trying to design their efforts on what Clausewitz thought was the power of your resistance.

He erroneously thought that your power, in that way, had to have two factors to stay strong.

page 16 The Maximum Exertion of Strength – On War

If you want to overcome your enemy you must match your effort against his power of resistance, which can be expressed as the product of two inseparable factors, viz. the total means at his disposal and the strength of his will. The extent of the means at his disposal is a matter––though not exclusively––of figures, and should be measurable.

See how he tied “the total means” as somehow having equal weight with strength of will?

He couldn’t be more wrong. But, you will see these people try to destroy those means, be it money, friends, father, mother, whatever.

I’ll show you one way that’s he’s very wrong.

Means that they can see. Notice the rather strong possibility for a very large problem for them? Means that exist where they can’t see or have no idea where to look.

Here’s probably the biggest way that he’s wrong.

Means are never inexorably tied to strength of will, that’s a spiritual thing, a quantity that cannot possibly ever be accurately measured.

Even Clausewitz knew that, he just didn’t really know what to do about it other than to say: Guess! basically.

But the strength of his will is much less easy to determine and can only be gauged approximately by the strength of the motive animating it. Assuming you arrive in this way at a reasonably accurate estimate of the enemy’s power of resistance, you can adjust your own efforts accordingly; that is, you can either increase them until they surpass the enemy’s or, if this is beyond your means, you can make your efforts as great as possible.

.

All you really need to remember about any of these tactics is this –

Chapter 2, page 32 – On War

[…] the warcannot be considered to have ended so long as the enemy’s will has not been broken

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Even they know that.

Make sure you know it too.

the magic point - the critical-point

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By

Virg sig script

Reference list –

1 – Handling the PTS on 8 June 1965. You can listen to that lecture here.

2 – Hubbard Communications Office Policy Letter (HCOPL for short) called Battle Tactics written by Ron Hubbard. The HCOPL was first issued in 1969 and it was made part of the Confidential GO Intelligence Course (Section 4 Part D, #6). It was reissued by the Office of Special Affairs for its “intelligence” course.

3 – On War by CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ; Translated by MICHAEL HOWARD and PETER PARET Abridged with an Introduction and Notes by BEATRICE HEUSER; originally published 1976, published with new intro in 2007.

 

Join the conversation! 4 Comments

  1. Just a note here to let you guys know that it’s almost impossible to access your website – the “Mcclaughry’s blog” via google or any other search engine. For about 2 weeks now it’s real tough trying to even find your sight during a search. It just does not pop up. Other sights pop up but not this one. I have to go in to it via some other similar website, and even that is difficult.

    Hope you can fix this so it’s easier to access.

    Reply
  2. Mike, I just realized – I tried using a search engine called DuckDuckGo to access your site. It worked before, but has not lately. DuckDuckGo is a more private secure search engine that respects privacy a little more than others. For some reason it now does not access your site the last few weeks. Google still does, and that’s what we used today.

    Can’t wait for your next article.

    Reply
    • Dave – interesting. At duckduckgo if you type mike mcclaughry blog, let it load the results and switch to images tab there are any number of results that will take you straight into the blog.

      Reply

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